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Abstract
T
he paper examines how the environment and climate change issues were 
gradually upgraded within the policy-making framework of the Common 
Agricultural Policy and contributed to the formulation of the green architecture 
for European agriculture. The analysis is based on theories of policy change 
-mainly neo-institutionalism and historical institutionalism- within the multilevel 
governance framework. Also, the United Nation’s development goal for climate 
action (SDG-13) is presented to show the change in the policy-making at the 
international level, to adapt to the climate change challenge. From the analysis, 
it is recognized that policy change seems to be redefi ning the historical path of the 
previous period within the EU and the global context. 
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Η Πράσινη Αρχιτεκτονική της ΚΑΠ και ο Αναπτυξια-
κός στόχος του ΟΗΕ για την κλιματική δράση: Αλλαγή 
πολιτικής και προσαρμογή
Γιάννης Ελ. Δούκας, Εντεταλμένος Διδασκαλίας, ΕΚΠΑ
Παύλος Πετίδης, Συνεργάτης Ερευνητής, ΕΚΟΠΔΑ, ΕΚΠΑ
Περίληψη
Η 
εργασία επιχειρεί να εξετάσει πώς τα ζητήματα του περιβάλλοντος και της κλι-
ματικής αλλαγής αναβαθμίστηκαν σταδιακά και ενσωματώθηκαν στη λειτουρ-
γία  της Κοινής Αγροτικής Πολιτικής, συμβάλλοντας στη  διαμόρφωση της πράσινης 
αρχιτεκτονικής για την ευρωπαϊκή γεωργία. Η ανάλυση βασίζεται στις θεωρίες της 
αλλαγής πολιτικής - κυρίως της νεοθεσμικής προσέγγισης και του ιστορικού θεσμι-
σμού- μέσα στο πλαίσιο της  πολυεπίπεδης διακυβέρνησης. Επίσης, παρουσιάζεται ο 
αναπτυξιακός στόχος του ΟΗΕ για την κλιματική δράση (SDG-13), ώστε να δειχθεί 
η αλλαγή στη χάραξη πολιτικής, στο διεθνές επίπεδο, και η προσαρμογή της απένα-
ντι στην  πρόκληση  της κλιματικής αλλαγής. Από την ανάλυση προκύπτει,  ότι η 
αλλαγή πολιτικής για το κλίμα και το περιβάλλον, φαίνεται να επαναπροσδιορίζει 
το ιστορικό μονοπάτι της προηγούμενης περιόδου, εντός της ΕΕ και διεθνώς.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ–ΚΛΕΙΔΙΑ: ΚΑΠ, ΟΗΕ, κλιματική αλλαγή, αλλαγή πολιτικής, 
πράσινη αρχιτεκτονική 
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he Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) results in a wide range of costs and 
benefi ts among the Member States, leading to a contrast of priorities and 
expectations. It represents a signifi cant distinction in distributing benefi ts among 
the various actors who participate formally or informally in its formulation since 
it is a common and essentially binding policy. National priorities, bureaucrats, 
sectoral interests, and other agriculture-related pressure groups are among them.
Additionally, the CAP combines social, economic, and environmental 
approaches to achieve a sustainable agriculture system in the European Union 
(EU). Hence, good environmental conditions support agricultural activities, 
allowing farmers to exploit natural resources, produce agro-food, and secure 
their income. As a result, the agricultural income supports farm families and 
rural communities, while agricultural production supports society (EC, 2021). 
Furthermore, agriculture is especially vulnerable to climate change, as weather 
conditions directly infl uence farming activities. On the other hand, agriculture 
can help mitigate climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
sequestering carbon while preserving food production.
Also, the Paris Agreement expands on the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, uniting all nations in the fi ght to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions effi ciently and enhance countries’ capacity to establish resilience and 
respond to climate change impacts, including by ensuring adequate assistance 
for developing countries. With the early entry into force of the Paris Agreement 
and the effective introduction of the Katowice Climate Package, the world 
has reached a new period in its collective efforts to combat climate change, 
concentrating on urgently growing commitment and implementation at all levels 
of government, industry, and civil society.
The paper focuses on how environmental and climate change concerns were 
progressively elevated within the EU’s CAP policy-making process, contributing 
to creating a green architecture for European agriculture. Within the EU’s 
multilevel governance system, the research is focused on policy change theories, 
primarily neo-institutionalism and historical institutionalism. Also, the UN 
development goal for climate action (SDG-13) is presented to demonstrate 
the shift in policy-making at the international level to adapt to the climate 
change challenge. It is noted that the EU has signed up to new international 
commitments, like the UN-Paris Agreement, concerning actions to deal with 
climate change and sustainable development issues.
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2. Theorizing Policy change
F
or several years, academic researchers have focused on the study of 
organizations and their interactions. Social theorists started to systematize 
this body of literature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
They concentrated on the organizational structure (i.e., bureaucracy) within 
society and the institutionalization caused by the “iron cage” that organizational 
bureaucracies build (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Until the 1950s, the study of political 
institutions dominated political science in the United Kingdom and the United 
States. This approach, often referred to as old institutionalism, focused on a 
comparative examination of the formal institutions of government and the state 
(Andreou, 2018). It was accompanied by a behavioral movement that introduced 
new theories on understanding policy-making and policy change, like positivism, 
rational choice theory, and behaviorism. The limited emphasis on institutions 
was abandoned in favor of analyzing people rather than institutions surrounding 
them. Institutionalism underwent a signifi cant resurgence in 1977, thanks to 
an infl uential paper written by John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan. The revised 
formulation of institutionalism presented in this paper resulted in a dramatic 
change in how institutional research was carried out (Andreou, 2018). The 
following decade saw a fl ood of literature on the subject from a wide range of 
disciplines, including those outside the social sciences.
March and Olsen introduced the term “ neo-institutionalism” in 1984. 
Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo distinguished new institutionalism from 
old institutionalism, which was overwhelmingly based on detailed institutional 
narratives with little emphasis on comparative studies (Thelen and Steinmo, 
1992). In their analysis, they pointed out that institutions exert an autonomous 
infl uence on political behavior and thus affect the outcomes of political processes. 
Neo-institutionalism primarily expressed a spirit of reaction to the then-
dominant theoretical currents of behaviorism, especially the proposition that 
the basic premise of political analysis is observable behavior. Behavior cannot 
be understood without reference to the institutions in which it manifests itself. 
In other words, behavioral perceptions underestimated the actual extent to 
which institutions infl uence politics because they viewed political institutions 
as neutral fi elds in which political behavior is exercised rather than as factors 
that shape political behavior itself (Andreou, 2018). Historical institutionalists 
have concentrated on explaining institutional continuity, with one crucial point 
being that all political activities occur within a historical framework. History is 
viewed as something that infl uences future decisions, actions, and happenings 
rather than as a series of discrete events (Hall and Taylor, 1996). In this article, 
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emphasis is going to be placed on the concepts of “new institutionalism” and 
“historical institutionalism” and their interconnection with policy change defi ned 
as the incremental shifts in existing structures or new and innovative policies 
(Bennett and Howlett, 1992).
Despite its insistence on institutional consistency, historical institutionalism 
was soon confronted with the issue of institutional change. When examining the 
issue of policy change (or lack thereof), the literature on path dependency may 
be helpful (Pierson, 2000). Path dependency means that once established, the 
institutions have started down historically developed specifi c paths where the 
costs of turning around are exceedingly high (Levi, 1997). Institutions «lock in» 
and then grow within the paths of their dependency from the moment they are 
formed (Andreou, 2018). Therefore, the evolution of institutions and policies is 
guided by specifi c “trajectories,” including intentional and unintended (and/or 
unpredictable) consequences and ineffi ciencies. As a result of this lock, changing 
policies is usually tricky because institutions are sticky, and actors defend the 
current model because they represent the needs of their founders during their 
creation (even if it is suboptimal) (Greener, 2002). According to Pierson (2000), 
public policies and formal structures are typically structured to be challenging 
to alter because previous decisions foster policy continuity. The impact of the 
institutional environment develops as, over time, rational actors integrate into 
it, with the result that their strategic choices become more and more limited and 
more clearly delimited by systemic factors. Thus, institutional change may occur 
within a particular context, the scope, and characteristics affected by previous 
political and institutional decisions.
The analyses of historical institutionalism also addressed institutional 
change through the model of “punctuated equilibrium” (P.E.). For the most pro-
longed period of their existence, the institutions are in a state of equilibrium, 
operating according to their decisions at the time of their creation or accord-
ing to the decisions taken at the last punctuation point. The PE highlights the 
importance of the institutional climate in infl uencing policy dynamics and fu-
ture reform outcomes. Since institutions are designed to be strictly traditional, 
substantial change can only be derived exogenously, opening up opportunities 
for those (individuals and interest groups) pursuing policy innovation. Critical 
turning points intersect long periods of institutional stability and dependence 
on the historical trajectory. Critical junctures are defi ned as a short period when 
uncertainty about the future of an institution creates the conditions for the 
institution to be put by policymakers on a new course of development, where the 
choices of radical institutional change are visible and possible (Hall and Taylor, 
1996). A critical juncture does not have to occur at a point in time where the im-
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plications of the juncture can be discerned later. Instead, as Steinmo argues, the 
critical juncture occurs much earlier in the process, long before its effects are vis-
ible (Thelen and Steinmo, 1995). The term “short periods” means that the critical 
turning points last more minor than the period during which the institutions are 
trapped within their paths of dependence. During the turning points, the actors 
can make choices about the evolution of an institution and policies that should 
be introduced to cope with the new challenges. 
As part of their systematic effort to tackle institutional change, Streeck 
and Thelen (2005) made several additions to the conceptual arsenal of the 
historic institution. Theories of institutional change can be theories of policy 
change, when ‘policies stipulate rules that assign normatively backed rights 
and responsibilities to actors and provide for their public, that is third party 
enforcement’ (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Policies are institutions in the sense 
that ‘they constitute rules for actors other than for policymakers themselves, rules 
that can and need to be implemented and that are legitimate in that they will if 
necessary be enforced by agents acting on behalf of society (Streeck and Thelen, 
2005). By distinguishing between the process of institutional change, which can 
be either incremental or abrupt, and the result of institutional change, which can 
bring about either continuity or discontinuity, they identifi ed fi ve different types 
of incremental change, either exogenous or endogenous. Firstly, displacement 
is the simplest version of institutional change, which refers to the gradual 
change in the content of the regulatory structures that make up the institution. 
Institutional arrangements are susceptible to change when existing structures 
are challenged or moved to the side in favor of new institutions and associated 
behavioral logics. Such transformations are often brought on by rediscovery or 
activation and the development of alternative institutional types (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005). Layering constitutes the second category, entails active support of 
amendments, modifi cations, or revisions to an existing collection of institutions. 
Change occurs via differential paths: the implementation of new elements sets in 
motion dynamics that, over time, actively crowd out or usurp the old structure, 
whose domain shrinks in comparison to before (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). In 
this case, new rules and/or organizations are introduced alongside or on top of 
pre-existing ones. This is a common practice in states with high partisanship, 
where the government chooses to establish new systems and/or laws to “regulate” 
its party clientele without explicitly impacting state structures (Andreou, 2018).
If institutions do not adapt to changing political and economic environments, 
they can erode or atrophy in drift. Gaps in the rules may trigger it. Political 
cultivation will help to bring about change (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Because 
this is a short adaptation of the institution to the changes of the external 
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environment, this neglect can be either intentional or not. In the process of 
conversion, institutions are redirected to new objectives, roles, or purposes. This 
could happen due to new environmental problems or shifts in power dynamics, or 
it could happen as a result of political competition over what roles and objectives 
an established institution could serve. Unforeseen consequences are expected, 
and change necessitates compromise as actors exploit ambiguities. For this form 
of transition, time is essential (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Finally, exhaustion is 
a mechanism that contributes to failure, which distinguishes it from the other 
four shift cycles (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). The breakdown, on the other hand, is 
incremental rather than sudden. Exhaustion may occur when an institution’s daily 
operations weaken its external preconditions and resources dwindle (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005). Unlike in the case of drift, where the organization maintains its 
formal integrity while being increasingly dysfunctional, in the case of exhaustion, 
the activities that occur within the institution weaken its functioning.
In the context of public policy research, the contribution of ideas and 
learning to systemic change has been extensively studied. This viewpoint holds 
that much of political discourse is a phase of social learning manifested by public 
policy. More precisely, public policy (in time t1) emerges as a result of a learning 
process, with the previous (time t0) public policy exerting the most signifi cant 
cognitive infl uence. As a result, public policy responds to the consequences of 
previous policies rather than explicitly to social and economic circumstances. 
Hall describes social learning as a process “The deliberate effort to change the 
goals or strategies of public policy in order to correspond with old knowledge and 
new facts. The fact that policy shifts as a result of such a mechanism indicates 
learning” (Hall, 1993). The specialists in the particular area of public policy who 
either work for the state or advise it from privileged positions at the interface 
of the bureaucracy and the intellectual pockets of society are the key players in 
this learning process. Social learning, as a change in public policy, is divided into 
three stages that correspond to an equal number of variables of its content: the 
overriding goals that guide public policy in a particular fi eld, the public policy 
techniques or tools used to achieve the goals they, and the exact prices of these 
tools. Historical neo-institutionalists, who recognize that institutions refl ect, 
structure, and reproduce unequal power relations, believe that both the creation 
and the change of an institution and/or policy are often the object and/or result 
of confl ict between groups with different powers of infl uence (Andreou, 2018).
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3. The UN’s Climate Action goal for Sustainable Development
C
limate change affects every region of the globe. The polar ice caps are 
melting, and sea levels are increasing. Extreme weather events and fl ooding 
are becoming more common in some regions, while extreme heat waves and 
droughts are becoming more common in others. According to the offi cial United 
Nation (UN) metrics, between 1880 and 2012, the global average temperature 
increased by 0.85°C. To put this in perspective, every degree of temperature rise 
reduces grain yields by around 5%. Between 1981 and 2002, corn, wheat, and 
other signifi cant crops experienced signifi cant yield losses of up to 40 megatons 
per year due to a warmer environment. The seas have warmed, there is less snow 
and ice on the planet, and the sea level has risen. Between 1901 and 2010, the 
global average sea level rose by 19 cm as oceans expanded due to warming and ice 
melted. Since 1979, the Arctic’s sea ice extent has decreased in each decade, with 
1.07 million km2 of ice loss per decade. Since 1990, global carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions have risen by nearly 50%. Emissions increased faster between 2000 
and 2010 than in the previous three decades. It is still possible to restrict the rise 
in global mean temperature to two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels 
by implementing a broad range of technical steps and behavioral improvements. 
Signifi cant structural and technical changes will increase the likelihood that 
global warming will not reach this level (U.N., 2021). 
For that reason, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which all 
U.N. Member States including the EU28 adopted in 2015, offers a shared blueprint 
for stability and prosperity for people and the world now and in the future. The 
17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are centered at their heart, and they 
represent an immediate call to action for all countries in a global partnership. 
All countries accepted that eradicating poverty and other deprivations must be 
followed by policies that secure a sustainable agro-food chain, improve  health 
and education, reduce inequalities, and promote economic growth while fi ghting 
climate change and protecting the oceans and forests. Each aim usually has 8 to 12 
targets, and each target has between 1 and 4 metrics used to track progress against 
the goals. The goals are either “outcome” targets (to be achieved circumstances) 
or “means of implementation” targets (U.N., 2021). A variety of resources for 
tracking and visualizing progress against targets are available to help with 
monitoring. SDG-Tracker, an online publication released in June 2018, displays 
available data across all measures. Limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius 
will necessitate rapid, far-reaching, and unparalleled improvements in all facets 
of society, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 
their 2018 Climate Report.
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In paragraph 14 of the Agenda, climate change is identifi ed as “one of the 
greatest challenges of our time,” with concerns that “its negative impacts threaten 
the capacity of all countries to achieve sustainable development.” Regarding 
Sustainable Development Goal 13 for Climate Change, the targets cover a wide 
range of issues surrounding climate action. There are fi ve targets in total. The 
fi rst three targets are “output targets”: Strengthen resilience and adaptive 
capacity to climate-related disasters; integrate climate change measures into 
policies and planning; build knowledge and capacity to meet climate change. 
The remaining two targets are “means of achieving” targets: To implement the 
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change; and to promote mechanisms 
to raise capacity for planning and management. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the primary international, 
intergovernmental forum for negotiating the global response to climate change. 
Under this framework, Sustainable Development Goal 13 aims to increase all 
countries’ resilience and adaptive ability to climate-related hazards and natural 
disasters by identifying risks and opportunities caused by climate change. 
In addition, climate change measures should be incorporated into national 
policies and plans so as to improve climate change mitigation, adaptation, 
impact reduction, and early warning education, understanding. Although 
greenhouse gas emissions are projected to drop about 6 percent in 2021 due to 
travel bans and economic slowdowns resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, 
this improvement is only temporary (U.N.. 2021) Once the global economy 
begins to recover from the pandemic, emissions are expected to return to higher 
levels. Countries should carry out the commitment made by developed-country 
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to 
mobilize 100 billion dollars annually from all sources by 2020 to address the 
needs of developing countries in the context of meaningful mitigation actions 
and transparency on implementation, and fully operationalize the Green 
Climate Fund (U.N., 2021). Countries promote mechanisms for building capacity 
in the least developed countries and small island developing states for successful 
climate change planning and management, emphasizing women, youth, and 
local and disadvantaged communities.
The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 has triggered global disturbances in 
development and human activity, with some positive environmental effects in 
terms of GHG emissions. China, in particular, has seen a dramatic drop in coal-
fi red power station usage, owing to a 5% drop in national and global energy 
demand. Many areas of the world have seen a decrease in air pollution and NO2 
emissions into the atmosphere. The rates of COVID–19 outbreak are expected to 
have an impact on air quality along with climate variability, including latitude, 
perifereia t.11.indd   114 28/5/2021   12:53:54 µµ
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:16:21 |
REGION & PERIPHERY [115]
temperature, and moisture; this is only to support the importance of close 
surveillance, effective collaborative international communications, and early 
warning systems, and compatibility with SDGs for preparation, adaptation, and 
resilience. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a signifi cant 
decrease in human activity and an economic crisis. As a result, greenhouse gas 
emissions are expected to fall by 6% by 2020. In this context, the estimated 6% 
reduction in emissions for 2020 is insuffi cient to meet the goal. When the limits 
imposed to combat the pandemic are lifted, emissions are expected to increase. 
As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the year 2020 has seen a decrease in 
the movement of climate crises, with a drop of 6% in CO2 emissions reported 
this year and possibly up to 8%, the most signifi cant year-on-year reduction on 
record. As a result, UNEP assists both investors and policymakers in funding 
and fi scal stimulus packages and prioritizing green and decent employment.
The Paris Agreement expands on the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change1, uniting all nations in the fi ght to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions quickly and improve countries’ capacity to create resilience and 
respond to climate change impacts, including by ensuring adequate assistance 
for developing countries. With the early entry into force of the Paris Agreement 
and the effective introduction of the Katowice Climate Package, the world 
has reached a new period in its collective efforts to combat climate change, 
concentrating us on urgently growing commitment and implementation at all 
levels of government, industry, and civil society (U.N., 2021). 
The fact that most of the worst impacts of climate change are too severe 
and too rapid to be prevented by adaptation measures raised a new challenge 
that has emerged as a focal point during the Paris negotiations. In particular, 
the Paris Agreement recognizes that losses and damages of this nature must be 
addressed and seeks to fi nd suitable answers. It states that loss and damage can 
take different forms—both as immediate impacts from severe weather and slow-
rise effects, such as land loss at sea for lower islands with severe adverse effects 
for the agricultural production (Climate Focus, 2015). 
While the NDCs of each Party may not be legally binding, the Parties are 
legally bound by technical expert analysis to monitor their progress towards 
the NDC and identify forms of reinforcement of their ambitions. The “enhanced 
accountability system for action and assistance” articulates Article 13 of the Paris 
Accord, which lays down harmonized monitoring, reporting, and verifi cation 
(MRV) standards. Thus, developed and developing nations shall be subject to 
technical and peer review and report on their mitigation efforts every two years 
(Climate Focus, 2015). The Agreement acknowledges the different situations 
of specifi c nations and states in particular that professional expert reviews 
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recognize the unique reporting capabilities of each country (Van Asselt, 2016). 
In line with the above, the developing countries reaffi rmed their commitments 
to mobilize $100 billion a year on climate fi nancing by 2020 at the 2015 Paris 
Conference, where the Agreement was discussed and decided to mobilize $100 
billion in climate fi nance per annum by 2025. The funds are for development 
mitigation and adaptation support. This money covers funding for the UNFCCC 
Green Climate Fund and a range of other public and private undertakings. 
Until 2025, new leas of $100 trillion annually must be settled upon in the Paris 
Agreement (Roberts et al., 2021).
In contrast with the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord, the Paris 
Agreement constitutes a binding arrangement that brings all nations together 
for the fi rst time in the multilateral climate change process to implement 
ambitious measures to address and accommodate climate change. The Paris 
Convention reiterates that developed countries should lead the way in providing 
fi nancial support to less docile and needy countries while allowing for fi rst-
time volunteer contributions from other Parties. Mitigation requires climate 
fi nancing because large-scale investments are needed to reduce emissions 
substantially. Climate fi nance is also critical for adaptation, as substantial 
fi nancial resources are required to adapt to the adverse effects and mitigate the 
impacts of climate change. Countries created a more transparent structure with 
the Paris Agreement (ETF). In 2024, countries will report transparently on steps 
taken and progress made in climate change mitigation, adaptation initiatives, 
and assistance given or obtained under the ETF. It also specifi es international 
protocols for reviewing submitted papers (UN, 2021).
Despite the minor benefi ts to pollution reductions brought on by the 
COVID-19 pandemic, SDG 13 continues to face several challenges. In the interest 
of economic stimulus, an estimated 6% decrease in global emissions and historic 
carbon emission reductions are also expected to recover to emission levels higher 
than the initial decline. Economic policy fi nancing would most likely divert 
emergency funds generally allocated to environment funding, such as The Green 
Climate Fund and environmental policies, unless a focus is placed on green deals 
in redirecting monetary funds. Government lockout controls are expected to ease, 
resulting in a rebound in transportation emissions. This is due to countries such 
as the United States lowering productivity levels and limiting environmental 
standard compliance. The United Nations Climate Change Conference U.K. 
‘20, also known as COP26, has been postponed. This is yet another setback and 
reminder of how collective action has been placed on hold as nations worldwide 
recover from the pandemic’s aftermath.
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Climate change is widely recognized as a defi ning threat of our time, so, 
unsurprisingly, one of the SDGs (13) calls for “urgent action to tackle climate 
change and its impacts.” According to a meta-analysis of climate change 
impacts, 70% of studies show crop yield declines by 2030, with half of the studies 
showing 10–50% declines. Climate change is already affecting food systems, and 
agriculture is one of the most affected industries by climate change. Agriculture 
and associated land-use transition account for about a quarter of annual GHG 
emissions worldwide. If the global warming goal is not met, signifi cant emissions 
reductions in food systems would be needed. As a result, achieving SDG 13 
would necessitate numerous adaptation and mitigation actions in food systems. 
A signifi cant challenge is that food systems are connected to many SDGs, and 
there are likely to be trade-offs among SDGs through food system behavior, with 
trade-offs becoming especially diffi cult in developing countries where climate 
change vulnerability is greatest. Transformative actions in the food system are 
critical for achieving SDG 13 and UNFCCC agreements, but actions must be 
carefully considered due to the likelihood of trade-offs between adaptation and 
mitigation, among other SDGs. The challenges are enormous, necessitating 
nothing less than a revolution of food systems, with exact behavior based 
on context. Food systems are changing in many ways, but many researchers 
argue that the transition must be much more signifi cant in the coming years 
in order to ensure food security, climate change mitigation, and environmental 
sustainability. In addition, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) is 
assisting nations in adapting to and mitigating the consequences of climate 
change by developing national climate plans and implementing research-based 
programs and initiatives, with a focus on smallholder agriculture and making 
rural communities’ livelihoods more robust (FAO, 2019).
4. CAP and the challenge of climate change and the envi-
ronment
G
ood environmental conditions support agricultural activities, allowing farmers 
to exploit natural resources, produce agro-food, and secure their income. As a 
result, agriculture’s revenue supports farm families and rural communities, while 
agricultural production supports society as a whole (EC, 2021). Furthermore, 
agriculture is especially vulnerable to climate change, as farming activities are 
directly infl uenced by weather conditions. Agriculture, by emitting greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere, also contributes to climate change.  Agriculture, on 
the other hand, can help to mitigate climate change by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions and sequestering carbon while preserving food production. The CAP 
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therefore combines social, economic, and environmental approaches on the path 
towards achieving a sustainable system of agriculture in the EU. Further steps in 
this path are taken in the new CAP, as the EU has signed up to new international 
commitments concerning actions to deal with the climate change and sustainable 
development issues, which will be built around a new and more ambitious green 
architecture (EC, 2021a). But this was not always the case.
Preservation and protection of the environment were not included in the 
CAP founding principles, as there were other policy priorities. There was a 
gradual change in this perception that manifested itself in the early 1970s 
when environmental problems began to be politicized, and continued more 
vigorously in the 1980s with the so-called “Green Paper” on the prospects of the 
CAP, recognizing the great importance of environmental protection, the 1988 
Communication on “Environment and Agriculture” and the handbook “The 
Future of Rural Society” highlighting the need to reduce destructive agricultural 
practices and turn to environmentally friendly production processes (Louloudis 
et al., 1999). 
Also, due to the food scandals that erupted in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
and the negative environmental impact of the agricultural model promoted 
by the CAP, the consumer and environmental movement gradually began to 
grow and strengthen for policy changes. These endogenous pressures resulted 
in the signifi cant reform of the CAP in 1992. Therefore, from 1992 onwards, 
environmental issues took a central place in the successive CAP reforms. The 1992 
agri-environmental measures were an innovation, although the relevant budget 
expenditures were limited compared to the traditional CAP measures. This is 
the fi rst signifi cant attempt to subsidize agriculture as a source of production of 
environmental benefi ts. The Agenda 2000 that followed and the concept of the 
“second pillar” for Rural Development extended this idea (Doukas, 2011).
The Agenda 2000 reform package introduced the Rural Development 
Pillar in the CAP, emphasizing the environmental outcomes and the safe agri-
food products. It has established the link between environmental protection 
requirements and direct payments to support producers. Member States were 
pressured to take appropriate environmental measures through a set of actions 
regarding the different activities taking place in the countryside but recognizing 
the central role of agricultural production. In addition, Member States were given 
fl exibility in supporting farmers in conjunction with environmental measures and 
the imposition of possible sanctions to reduce or abolish support aid if they did not 
comply. The amounts of support that were ultimately not given to producers were 
transferred to the Member State’s rural development program (Doukas, 2018).
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In addition, Member States should draw up comprehensive national or 
regional programs from a list of possible measures, of which environmental 
protection and climate action was a prerequisite. These measures strengthened 
actions to educate farmers on environmentally friendly processes to support 
less-favoured areas and exceptionally high ecological value forests. In addition, 
incentives were provided for the Member States to use part of this funding to 
promote more environmentally friendly production methods in the beef and 
milk sectors.
Cross-compliance was a mandatory requirement in the CAP’s Mid-Term 
Review (MTR) in 2003, and it applied to all direct payments. Cross-compliance 
establishes environmental and other requirements that farmers must meet 
in order to obtain subsidies. Cross-compliance norms included statutory 
management requirements under Union law as well as criteria for excellent 
agricultural and environmental condition of land establishment (EC, 2021c).
During the last two decades, more efforts have been made through the CAP, 
based on the specifi c soil-climatic characteristics of each region, to motivate 
farmers to adopt more environmentally friendly practices in plant and animal 
production and to achieve the most effi cient exploitation of natural resources 
by integrating new technologies across the framework of the production process 
(Doukas, 2018). Under the new CAP system, farmers receive the green direct 
payment (representing 30% of the direct payment budget) if they meet three 
required environmental criteria (soil and biodiversity in particular). Farmers 
must diversify their crops, conserve permanent grassland, and preserve 
biodiversity, as well as allocate 5% of arable land to areas that are conducive to 
biodiversity [Ecological Focus Areas (EFA)] (Doukas, 2014).
There are exemptions to the rules, depending on the individual situation—for 
instance, farmers with a large proportion of grassland, which is environmentally 
benefi cial. At the national or regional level, EU countries determine the 
proportion of permanent grassland to agricultural land (with a 5 percent margin 
of fl exibility). Furthermore, EU countries declare areas of permanent grassland 
that are environmentally sensitive. In these areas, farmers are unable to plough 
or convert permanent grassland. Also, the greening rules do not apply to farmers 
who opted for the small farmer’s scheme for administrative and proportionality 
reasons. (EC, 2021d).
Furthermore, organic farmers automatically receive a greening payment for 
their farm because the nature of their production deems them to have environ-
mental benefi ts. Other exemptions can apply, depending on a farmer’s specifi c 
situation. Direct payments would be reduced for farmers who do not follow the 
greening laws. Given the scope of the greening criteria, such reductions refl ect 
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the amount of hectares listed as non-compliant (Doukas 2014).  As the green 
direct payment is compulsory, it can introduce practices that are benefi cial for 
the environment and climate change on a large part of the utilized agricultural 
area. The aim is to set specifi c and measurable criteria, as experience to date has 
shown that the Cross-Compliance regime provides a relatively loose framework 
of rules, which one can easily disregard and, at the same time, presents signifi -
cant weaknesses in terms of control mechanisms.
Nowadays, global population growth, urbanization patterns, depleted 
natural resources, and climate change-related agricultural production threats 
are putting much more strain on the agricultural sector around the world 
(Doukas, 2019). Furthermore, shifting rainfall patterns, increasing temperatures, 
seasonal variability, and extreme weather events such as heatwaves, droughts, 
storms, and fl oods are all being felt because of climate change across the EU, 
and especially in European agriculture. Severe climate change impacts, such 
as river fl oods, droughts, and coastal fl ooding, are putting human systems and 
habitats in Europe at risk. Even if some climatic changes will be benefi cial 
to some northern European regions, the vast majority will be detrimental, 
affecting areas that are already experiencing environmental or other changes. 
A combination of different types of these impacts can intensify vulnerabilities 
in different regions. Agriculture will be most affected in the EU’s southern and 
south-eastern areas. Agriculture must enhance its environmental performance 
by using more sustainable production methods, given the pressure on natural 
resources. Farmers must also respond to the threats posed by climate change 
and implement mitigation and adaptation strategies. One of the three key goals 
of the CAP is to promote sustainable natural resource management and climate 
change (EC, 2021b). Of course, European farmers, who work, produce, and invest 
in the broader European rural region, are the primary managers of the natural 
environment (Maravegias and Doukas, 2012).
Hence, according to the new operating framework of the CAP (2021-2027), 
the eligibility of direct payments depends on measurable environmental and 
climatic criteria. Thus, direct payments will depend on the achievement of 
environmental and climatic criteria, including the conservation of carbon-rich 
soils through the protection of wetlands, the sustainable management and 
improvement of water resources, and crop-rotation instead of crop diversifi cation. 
To this end, each member state must develop applications to support producers 
or provide incentives for good agricultural practices. The further upgrade of 
environmental concerns is expressed fi nancially by increasing the transfer of 
additional resources by 15%, from pillar 1 to pillar 2 for environmental and 
climate measures (EC, 2018a).
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In line with the above framework, the new green architecture is much 
more fl exible in its design and management, which is now entrusted to national 
authorities. It is planned to be structured in three strands which will include 
the new system of conditions, climate and environmental programs and agri-
environmental and climate measures, which will be funded by the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) (EC, 2018b).
In addition, a key priority is to improve fl exibility for MS to design rural 
development measures with an emphasis on adopting stricter criteria for safe 
food production and establishing rules for water quality protection, reducing 
pesticide use. and restriction of antibiotics. At the same time, an extensive 
incentive package is proposed to boost investment in the bioeconomy and improve 
living conditions in rural areas. Environmental and climate action envisages that 
at least 30%, nearly 23 billion euros, of the funding for the second pillar will be 
spent on climate and environmental measures, demonstrating the Commission’s 
willingness to consolidate these priorities. Finally, integrated environmental 
management and tackling the effects of climate change are enhanced as synergies 
with other relevant EU policies and programs are improved (EC, 2018a)
5. Policy change and the CAP’s Green Architecture 
H
istorical institutionalism has been used to demonstrate how decisions by 
Member States’ governments have limited their future behaviour and 
strengthened the independence and positions of supranational institutions. 
Leading speakers of historical institutionalism in the EU include Simon Bulmer 
(2009) and Paul Pierson (1996). They argued for the value of this approach to 
analysis and, as Bulmer puts it, the “description” of political activity and policy 
activities within the multilevel governance framework2. In particular, Bulmer 
supported and used the “governance regime” framework to analyze the EU at the 
level of specifi c policies of the subsystems.
The theory of rational choice institutionalism has been used primarily to 
explain the motivations of Member States› governments in the integration process 
and demonstrate the implications of different EU decision-making rules for the 
behaviour and infl uence of actors. In terms of the behaviour of governments, 
a characteristic feature of the rational choice analysis is that governments 
are actively participating in and delegating powers to the EU because in this 
way they derive several advantages, the most important of which are: reduced 
transaction costs through improved policy development, policy effectiveness, and 
policy compliance. It is based on the economic theory of rational behaviour. It 
satisfactorily interprets the positions taken over time by the various players in 
maintaining or reforming the CAP (Doukas 2011).
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The CAP’s implementation results in diverse costs and benefi ts among 
the Member States, creating confl icting priorities and expectations. Since it is 
a common and essentially binding policy, it creates a signifi cant distinction in 
distributing benefi ts among the various actors who engage formally or informally 
in its formulation. National priorities, committee bureaucrats, sectoral interests, 
and other agriculture-related pressure groups are among them (Doukas and 
Maravegias, 2021).
Historically, CAP reform decisions have always been a bargaining chip 
between the Commission and the Council of Agriculture and Rural Development 
Ministers, which represents the interests of farmers in their countries and those 
exercised by the main trading partners (e.g., UN and the members of the World 
Trade Organization). Throughout the historical course of the CAP, it has been 
a rare occurrence for large interest groups to be represented in the decision-
making process, which is especially true for consumer groups. However, some 
events in the late 1990s changed the data signifi cantly.
As it turned out, after the major problems that arose and the panic that 
prevailed in cases such as the bovine spongiform encephalopathy crisis, the 
detection of dioxins in food in Belgium and the «foot and mouth disease», 
consumers› demands for higher safety standards and food quality have increased 
signifi cantly, as have concerns about the impact of the CAP on the environment, 
animal health, and the adoption of practices for their proper treatment. 
These demands, as expected, became more intense, along with the increase 
in the level of income in the EU Member States. However, even before the reform 
process, these concerns had grown and intensifi ed out of fear of the above cases 
and remained a key priority for EU citizens. Regardless of how the CAP relates 
to these concerns, its political response has included raising these issues to the 
top of its agenda. The result was that, in countries such as Germany and Italy, 
the leaders of the Greens sought to attend the meetings of the relevant minis-
ters, contributing to an effort to review and redefi ne the CAP. (Swinnen, 2001).
Also, at the level of pressure groups, farmers’ professional organizations for 
almost three decades since the establishment of the CAP (1962-1992) were not 
threatened by other powerful groups promoting opposing positions and claims. 
However, due to food scandals and growing adverse environmental effects, con-
sumer and environmental movements have been strengthened over time due to 
the European model of agriculture that created negative environmental conse-
quences. As a result, they gradually increased their infl uence in the EU institu-
tions (Doukas, 2018).
Moreover, while cross-compliance seems to be politically justifi ed, its eco-
nomic philosophy was not always clear. The problem was whether the introduc-
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tion of new requirements for existing income support is an effective policy tool. 
Although this problem is beyond the scope of this analysis, let us consider the ef-
fectiveness of cross-compliance. For example, as we have shown, many research-
ers point out that direct payments were distributed according to agricultural 
policy objectives and not according to environmental objectives, thus linking two 
contradictory results and the lack of clear objectives of environmental policy. In-
deed, farms that are entirely dependent on direct payments should not “coincide” 
with those that cause severe environmental damage.
It is essential to consider how the decisions were made concerning the 
distribution of the savings from direct payments, more specifi cally from 
farmers’ non-compliance. Indeed, because the Member States could withhold 
only 25% of the money raised through the implementation of cross-compliance, 
the incentive to implement an effective control mechanism at the state level 
seemed to be low. Once again, political rhetoric did not seem to be in line with 
political reality, which means that the pressures and concerns that the new 
“players” have brought to the fore could have been more critical for the reform 
process. However, they were an essential ally of the Commission in achieving 
its objective reform goals for the environment and food safety. On the other 
hand, the corresponding weakening of the producer’s pressure groups during 
the last two decades also played an important role. This evolution was the 
result of the gradual reduction of the rural population, in absolute numbers but 
also as a percentage of the total EU workforce (Doukas, 2011).
Another crucial turning point in the path-dependence of the CAP’s structure 
and implementation was the introduction of the Green Payment Scheme.  That is 
the fi rst time that the environmental compliance of the producers is measurable, 
and the criteria for them to receive the total amount of the direct payments is 
thoroughly defi ned. Lastly, the obligations of the EU according to climate action 
and the severe consequences of climate change through the entire agro-food 
chain forced for an even more discrete allocation of measurements within the 
new framework of the CAP for the period 2021-2027.
As can be seen from the above, the intention to create a green architecture 
is clear, embodying a stable and at the same time fl exible framework aimed at 
“greening” the CAP.  For many decades, CAP was severely criticized for the 
negative environmental impacts associated with its philosophy and mode of 
operation and contributed to the intensifi cation of agricultural production and 
the depletion of natural resources. The new CAP strengthens the freedom of 
rational choice within a strict framework of joint commitments and objectives, 
with the predominant role of conditionality, i.e. linking funding to results, under 
the pressure of a reduced Budget. At the same time, with specifi c fi nancial tools, 
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the CAP is trying to highlight and upgrade issues related to the environment 
and climate change. Planning to achieve these goals includes both pillars of the 
CAP, promotes synergies with other similar policies and enhances fl exibility 
based on national priorities (Doukas, 2019).
6. Conclusions 
E
ven though issues concerning the effect of economic activity and the 
agricultural production on the environment and climate change were in the 
public discourse for more than forty years, more action has been placed on the 
policy change and adaptation to deal with those challenges during the last two 
decades. In particular, the power of farmers is reduced, and at the same time, the 
consumer and environmental movement is strengthened on an international scale 
and within the multilevel governance framework of the EU. Also, nowadays, it is 
generally recognized that agriculture is especially vulnerable to climate change, 
as weather conditions directly infl uence farming activities. At the same time, 
by emitting greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, agriculture also contributes 
to climate change. Additionally, the EU has signed up to new international 
commitments concerning actions to deal with climate change and sustainable 
development issues. The most profound example is the UN- Paris Agreement, 
which constitutes the fi rst-ever universal and legally binding global climate 
change agreement. 
As a result, a new green architecture is promoted within the new CAP for 
the programming period 2021-2027. The Policy adapts against the new climate 
challenges, as the eligibility of direct payments will depend on measurable 
environmental and climatic criteria, including the conservation of carbon-rich 
soils through the protection of wetlands, the sustainable management and 
improvement of water resources, and crop-rotation instead of crop diversifi cation. 
Also, environmental and climate action anticipates spending at least 30% of 
the second pillar’s fi nancing, or approximately 23 billion euros, on climate and 
environmental initiatives, underlining the Commission’s readiness to consolidate 
these objectives.
Moreover, at the international level, in contrast with the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Copenhagen Accord, the UN- Paris Agreement constitutes a binding 
arrangement that brings all nations together for the fi rst time in the multilateral 
climate change process to implement ambitious measures to address and 
accommodate climate change. Under the pressuring precept of measurable 
results, the Paris Convention reiterates that developed countries should 
lead the way providing fi nancial support to less docile and needy countries 
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while allowing for fi rst time volunteer contributions from other parties. As a 
result, climate fi nance has arisen as an essential pillar for adaptation because 
signifi cant fi nancial resources are needed to adapt to and mitigate the effects 
of climate change and large-scale investments are needed to reduce emissions 
substantially. This development  demonstrates a policy change that seems to be 
redefi ning the historical path of the previous period.
Notes
* Anowlegements: The authors thank Georgios Mermigas - member of the trade 
team “FAO Trade and Markets Division” - for the fruitful discussion before 
writing this paper.
1. In 1994, 192 countries ratifi ed an international treaty -- the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), commonly known 
as “the Convention” -- to begin to consider what can be done to reduce global 
warming (mitigation) and how to cope with whatever temperature increases are 
inevitable (adaptation). A number of nations approved an addition to the treaty: 
the Kyoto Protocol, which has more ambitious (and legally binding) measures 
(OECD, 2021) In addition, The 15th session of the Conference of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC and the 5th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol took place in Copenhagen and was 
hosted by the Government of Denmark (UN, 2021).
2. “Multilevel governance entails a conception of the EU as consisting of 
‘overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the 
interaction of political actors across those levels’ Additionally, multilevel 
governance pulls the private sphere into the political. Together this leads to a loss 
of the so-called ‘gate-keeping role’ of the state, as the conventional representation 
via state executives is curtailed. Hence multilevel governance eradicates the 
traditional distinction between domestic and international politics”. (Aalberts, 
2004 :24).
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